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Summary
On June 20 and 2, 2005, the Payment Cards Center of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, in conjunction with the Electronic Funds Transfer Association (EFTA), 
hosted a day-and-a-half forum, “Risky Business: Managing Electronic Payments in the 
2st Century.” The Center and EFTA invited participants from the financial services and 
processing sectors, law enforcement, academia, and policymakers to explore key topics 
associated with the challenge of effectively managing risk in a payments environment that is 
increasingly electronic. The meeting’s goal was to identify areas of potential risk and explore 
interindustry solutions. This paper provides highlights from the forum presentations and 
ensuing conversations.  
The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal 
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Introduction 
  Risk and banking are inextricably linked. In fact, 
some people contend that managing risk is the essence 
of banking. For financial institutions, as well as for the 
organizations that support them, effective risk man-
agement is essential to success. Organizations that are 
unwilling or unable to effectively manage risk diminish 
their franchises—with potentially painful outcomes for 
the public and private sectors. 
  The move from a largely paper-based payments 
system to one in which electronic payments predomi-
nate has created new opportunities for fraud and new 
risk management challenges for financial institutions. 
Whereas financial institutions could once dismiss 
electronic payments risk and its associated costs as a 
marginal cost of doing business, today the potential im-
plications cannot be ignored.
  The challenges to financial institutions are 
compounded by a new and uncharted environment 
that includes: 
•. Nontraditional.industry.participants. Payments 
processing is no longer a financial-institutions-
only business. Although new and nontraditional 
participants often fill important service voids and 
push the envelope of innovation, some may lack 
the experience and capabilities to implement risk 
management policies and technologies that meet 
traditional industry standards. 
•. Sophisticated.criminals. Today’s criminals are 
technologically and organizationally sophisticated, 
and they have extensive risk mitigation tools and 
information at their disposal. The Internet, for 
example, has eliminated the protective barrier of 
geography, opening borders for potential electronic 
payments crime, and created an inherently anony-
mous environment, adding a new level of chal-
lenge to “knowing your customer.” 
•. Increasingly.large.databases. Market-driven scale 
economies have led to a situation in which a num-
ber of firms are managing increasingly large data-
bases and facing the possibility that a single breach 
could place millions of accounts and customers 
at risk—and  even threaten the viability of major 
organizations. The potential threat is heightened 
by a high level of interdependency among industry 
participants, further expanding the possibilities of 
systemic risk and the potential to erode consumer 
confidence in the banking system. 
•. Speed.of.change. The speed of change in the pro-
cessing of electronic payments challenges the abil-
ity of the legal and regulatory communities to keep 
pace.
•. Focus.on.short-term.profitability..Intense compe-
tition and a focus on short-term profitability have 
the potential to undercut the principles of sound 
risk management. At what point do bottom-line 
pressures influence risk-management-related deci-
sion-making? 
  The meeting’s goal was to bring together a 
diverse group of industry leaders involved in electronic 
payments processing to identify areas of potential risk, 
address best practices to manage the risk and prevent 
fraud, and gain widespread support for collective ac-
tion to further safeguard the integrity of the system. 
Welcome
Peter Burns,.Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, and Director, Payment Cards Center
H. Kurt Helwig,.Executive Director, EFTA
Anthony M. Santomero, President, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia
  Peter Burns opened the conference by wel-
coming attendees to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia. In his remarks, he emphasized the Bank’s 
commitment to supporting industry efforts to address 
topical issues such as those to be covered during “Risky 
Business: Managing Electronic Payments in the 2st 
Century.” He noted that this meeting is the fourth col-
laboration between the Bank’s Payment Cards Center 
and the Electronic Funds Transfer Association (EFTA) 
and stressed the success of combining resources to 
facilitate a public-/private-sector dialogue on critical 
topics in electronic payments. 
  Kurt Helwig echoed Burns’s comments about 
the strength of the Payment Cards Center/EFTA re-
lationship and thanked him, and the entire Payment 
Cards Center staff, for their hospitality and contribu-
tions to the joint meetings. Helwig noted that the topic     Risky Business www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
for this conference arose during a roundtable at an 
EFTA board of directors meeting earlier in the year at 
which “payments risk” was unanimously identified as 
the top concern for the industry and for the businesses 
the directors represent. Consistent with EFTA’s mis-
sion to contribute to the advancement of electronic 
payments, the directors endorsed a cross-industry 
conference to explore risk holistically, focusing on the 
need to break down “silos” of operation and to address 
risk on an enterprise level. 
  Burns introduced Anthony Santomero, who 
thanked participants for their diligent efforts in main-
taining the security of electronic payments. Santomero 
noted the appropriateness of holding this discussion on 
electronic payments at a Federal Reserve Bank because 
payments were a primary reason for the establishment 
of the Federal Reserve System. He indicated that the 
United States is in the midst of an evolution to a new 
payment system in which paper processing is being 
displaced by electronic processing. While acknowledg-
ing the many benefits of electronic payments, he also 
noted that periods of transition can be difficult: Time 
is needed to identify and address the changes in the 
risk paradigm, and vigilance is necessary to ensure that 
unintended risk is not a consequence of electronifica-
tion. 
  Santomero emphasized that the payment 
system is built on and sustained by trust among the 
parties involved. He noted that addressing electronic 
payment risk is extremely topical—there are multiple 
articles in newspapers these days—and that there is a 
tremendous interest in many quarters about the sub-
jects to be addressed during the meeting, particularly 
identity theft and data security. 
  “It’s important to recognize that risk is the 
heart of the matter, and it’s a topic that is important to 
both the public and private sectors,” he said. “We have 
a joint mission to work together to address risk and 
preserve trust in the payments system. That’s why we 
are pleased to serve as the host for this meeting, which 
explores a timely and important topic.” 
Fraud Prevention and Mitigation: 
The Importance of a United Front 
Frank D’Angelo, Chairman, EFTA, and President and 
COO, Payment Solutions Group, Metavante Corpora-
tion 
Summary: As chairman of EFTA, Frank D’Angelo set the 
stage for the presentations that followed and highlighted the 
need for all participants in the electronic payments industry 
to work as a team to make a difference in the fight against 
fraud. He presented statistics from a variety of sources to 
emphasize the pervasiveness of electronic-based financial 
fraud and used a video developed by the United States 
Postal Inspection Service (www.usps.com/postalinspectors) 
to drive home the point that electronic payments fraud is 
not just about numbers; it has the potential to cause great 
harm in the lives of individuals. 
  D’Angelo began by stating that fraud is not a 
product issue, a financial institution issue, or a proces-
sor issue, but an issue that must be approached holisti-
cally and examined from all angles. He suggested that 
everyone involved in payments has a responsibility 
to do his or her part to deter fraud “because—in the 
end—our customers, families, friends, and each of us in 
this room could ultimately be a victim of identity theft 
or other fraudulent activities fueled by activities such 
as hacking, phishing, and skimming.” 
The Ever-Changing Face of Fraud 
  D’Angelo asserted that numbers tell the story 
of how fraud is manifested in today’s electronic pay-
ments environment:
•. Hacking
-  A month after DSW Shoe Warehouse an-
nounced a database hacking, investigators 
determined that transaction information from 
. million credit cards was stolen, a much 
larger figure than originally estimated.
-  A security breach at LexisNexis, a data col-
lection company, affected nearly 0 times the 
number of consumers first reported: The num-
ber grew to 0,000 from the original estimate 
of 2,000.
•. Phishing
-  According to TowerGroup, ,000 distinct 
phishing attacks were launched in 200; the 
number of attacks is predicted to grow to 
8,000 during 2005. 
-  Gartner Group and the Anti-Phishing Work-
ing Group suggest that the response rate to 
phishing attempts is 5 to 20 percent. Gartner Risky Business      www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
Group says that phishing is responsible for an 
estimated $.2 billion in direct losses to banks 
and credit card companies worldwide. 
-  Forrester Research says that phishing has 
prompted  percent of survey respondents 
to stop using online banking and bill payment 
and another 20 percent to steer clear of these 
types of services. (TowerGroup estimates on-
line banking is used in  million households.)
He also asserted that fraud is not limited to computer-
based schemes:
•. Insider.Data.Theft
-  In a Michigan State University study of ,000 
instances of identity theft, 0 percent were 
traced to insider data theft.
-  Gartner Group estimates that 0 percent of 
offenders who gain unauthorized access to in-
formation systems are employees and that 95 
percent of these employee-engineered intru-
sions result in significant financial losses. 
Consumer Confidence Is on the Line
. D’Angelo indicated that one of the keys to 
the success of electronic payments, as with all forms of 
payments, is consumer confidence. Without it, there is 
no growth, no innovation, and no benefit to providers, 
processors, or users. Consumers are increasingly being 
made aware of the risks associated with electronic pay-
ments and expect their financial service providers to 
create a safe environment in which to conduct their 
financial activities online:
•  According to Financial Insights, 0 percent of 
consumers surveyed were concerned about identity 
theft. The concern prompted  percent to switch 
financial institutions. 
•  Gartner Group predicts that 0 to 5 percent of 
U.S. banks will use an authentication method 
stronger than a password by 200 (token, smart 
card, biometrics, or personal information). 
Team Work 
  D’Angelo concluded his remarks by encourag-
ing payment industry participants to present a united 
front in working together to mitigate risk and protect 
the integrity of the payments system. “It is incumbent 
on us to work cooperatively to maintain consumer 
confidence in the system,” he stated. “This is a huge 
and never-ending challenge, but through forums, such 
as this one sponsored by the Payment Cards Center 
and the EFTA, we have the opportunity to bring to-
gether representatives from all segments of the industry 
to explore how we can work together to create an 
environment in which electronic payments can reach 
their full potential.” 
 
Government Affairs: 
Pending Legislation, Regulation, and 
Other Issues
Moderator:. Lynne Barr, Partner, Goodwin Procter,  
  and Counsel to EFTA 
Panelists:.. Nessa Feddis,.Senior Federal Counsel,  
  American Bankers Association
  Stuart Pratt, President, Consumer Data  
  Industry Association 
Summary: The timing of “Risky Business”—beginning on 
the first business day following the public announcement 
of the security breach that involved 40 million accounts at 
Arizona-based CardSystems Solutions, Inc.—significantly 
influenced the focus of this session on government affairs. 
Attendees were specifically interested in exploring compli-
ance issues related to the information security provisions of 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and understanding 
the issues that may be percolating in federal and state legis-
latures as a result of the recent series of high-profile security 
breaches. 
FACTA Addresses Identity Theft 
Nessa.Feddis
. Feddis focused her comments on the Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA or FACT 
Act), which, she indicated, is an example of Washing-
ton’s serious stance on halting the misuse of electronic 
data to facilitate crimes, such as identity theft, against 
consumers. 
  Identity theft occurs when a criminal uses 
another individual’s personal information—such as 
name, Social Security number, or credit card num-
ber—to take on that individual’s identity to commit 
fraud. The criminal, for example, may use personal 8    Risky Business www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
information to open a new credit card account in 
the individual’s name and establish a new address for 
statement mailings. When the individual doesn’t pay 
the bills (which he or she doesn’t know exist), the de-
linquent account is reported to a consumer reporting 
agency (CRA). The information recorded by the CRA 
has the potential to affect the individual’s ability to get 
credit, insurance, and even a job.  
  FACTA amends the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, which regulates who is entitled to have access 
to consumers’ credit report information and how that 
information may be used. In separate provisions related 
to identity theft, FACTA aims to protect consum-
ers by requiring the three major consumer reporting 
agencies (Experian, TransUnion, and Equifax) to send 
consumers, upon request, one free copy of their credit 
history during each 2-month period. In the best case 
scenario, consumers verify the information on their 
credit reports for accuracy and promptly report any in-
accuracies, thereby minimizing potential damage.  
  As Feddis explained, FACTA also attempts to 
protect consumers by requiring that CRAs block any 
information that occurs as a result of the theft and that 
they alert lenders. The CRA that receives the fraud 
alert coordinates with the other two and with lend-
ers, relieving consumers of the responsibility to notify 
multiple entities. The first fraud alert allows for an 
initial block of 90 days. Once the victim confirms that 
identity theft has occurred and obtains a police report 
(within 90 days), an extended alert may be placed on 
all files. 
  FACTA is being implemented in stages. Sec-
tions of FACTA for which rules were not necessary 
became effective December , 200. Sections that 
require rulemaking are being rolled out. Rules for the 
prescreening opt-out notice went into effect August 
2005, and those concerning medical information are 
planned for March 200. Additional proposed rules are 
anticipated. 
  According to Feddis, unlike most statutes, in 
which regulations provide fine-tuning, FACTA is an 
enormous statute with much of the detail in the rule-
making. “Regulators face an extremely difficult task 
in the rulemaking process for a number of reasons, 
including the dynamic nature of fraud, the diversity in 
the way financial institutions operate, and the chal-
lenge of providing enough detail to make rules useful 
without drawing a roadmap for fraudsters,” she said.
“Interagency Guidance for Banks”:
Responding to Security Breaches
Lynne.Barr
  Barr noted that the banking regulators’ “Inter-
agency Guidance for Banks,” finalized in March 2005, 
is intended to assist financial institutions and others 
involved in delivering financial services to protect 
customer financial information—as required in Sec-
tion 50 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). The 
guidelines cover implementing an information security 
program; specifying objectives; assessing risk; managing 
and controlling risk; testing, training, encrypting, and 
monitoring; and overseeing service providers. In light 
of the recent high-profile security breaches, the key 
issue for many in the industry is how financial institu-
tions should respond if their data are compromised. 
  Should a data security breach occur, Barr rec-
ommended that financial institutions take the follow-
ing actions: 
Preliminary.Steps
•  Consult counsel and notify legal department.
•  Investigate and repair breach, securing systems 
and determining the scope of information compro-
mised.
•  Notify primary regulator and law enforcement, as 
appropriate.
Consumer.Notification
•  Determine if the data security breach involved 
“personally identifiable” or “sensitive customer in-
formation” and whether unauthorized use of such 
information is “reasonably possible.”
•  Determine if you are affected by state consumer 
notification requirements, which may vary from—
and be more stringent than—federal require-
ments.
•  Prepare a consumer notification, ensuring that 
your statement is consistent with your stated priva-
cy policies and that your message is reassuring and 
helpful. You also should tell consumers what to do 
if they notice unusual activity on their accounts. 
 See also California guidance on best practices: www.
privacyprotection.ca.gov/recommendations/secbreach.pdf.Risky Business    9  www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
External Communications 
  She also recommended that financial institu-
tions take the following steps:
•  Notify: 
−	 MasterCard	and/or	Visa	and	bank	sponsor,	if	
card data are compromised.
−	 Insurers.
−	 Audit	committee	and	auditors.
•  Review contracts with service providers. 
•  Make public disclosure (8-K filing and press re-
lease).
•  File suspicious activity report (SAR).
Duties of Consumer Report Users 
  In addition to complying with the guidelines 
covered above, financial institutions must comply with 
Section 2 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transac-
tions Act (FACTA), effective July , 2005, requiring 
implementation of measures for proper disposal of con-
sumer information, defined as rendering the informa-
tion useless to anyone who might find it. The fine for 
noncompliance is $2,500 for each instance of neglect.  
Congressional Outlook 
Stuart.Pratt.
  Pratt stated that both Congress and the states 
are deeply concerned about the security of electronic 
financial transactions and the industry should expect a 
variety of actions as a result. 
String of Breaches Generates Publicity 
with Shelf Life
  “The factors driving legislative concern in-
clude the recent string of security breaches and the en-
suing media coverage, as well as the tremendous pub-
licity being given to phishing scams,” he said. “There is 
particular concern about the role of ‘data brokers’ and 
the security of the data they handle.” 
  Acknowledging that security breaches have 
existed for some time, Pratt asked and answered the 
question, “Why is this year different?” He contended 
that the relatively new California law, which requires 
public acknowledgment of security breaches and re-
porting to the California office of privacy, highlights 
the public element of security breaches. The Choice-
Point security breach, the first major occurrence after 
the California law became effective, heightened the 
awareness of all state legislators of the potential effect 
of such events on their citizens. In addition, the steady 
stream of subsequent security breaches—whether or 
not customer data were at risk—has given the stories 
“incredible shelf life as reporters weave together old 
breaches and new.” Collectively, these events and cov-
erage of them have created significant public unease 
about online security and safety, which is translating 
into legislative concern. 
State Activity: Expect More in 2006
  Pratt predicted that there is likely to be even 
greater intensity on the state level in 200, as legis-
lators move forward with laws and bills addressing 
information security and notification about security 
breaches. Groups such as USPIRG, Consumers Union, 
AARP , and the Privacy Rights Clearing House are pro-
ducing model bills and lobbying states to take action. 
  A key concern for Pratt’s constituency of 
credit bureaus, processors, and mortgage lenders is 
potential laws governing data brokers, which are not 
regulated at the federal level. He warned that such 
laws “move through quickly,” requiring vigilance on 
the part of interested parties. 
What’s Next in Congress?
  Congress’s first reaction to the publicity about 
breaches, according to Pratt, was to hold informational 
hearings related to jurisdictional issues. The hearings 
were held before a variety of congressional commit-
tees: House Energy and Commerce, House Financial 
Services, Senate Judiciary, Senate Banking, and Senate 
Commerce. Now that these hearings have concluded, 
bipartisan bills are likely to be introduced, and they 
will likely focus on regulating data brokers and Social 
Security numbers, providing notices about security 
breaches, and expanding GLBA-like information secu-
rity requirements beyond the original circle of financial 
institutions. Legislative hearings will follow, and the 
complex jurisdictional topography will affect the timing 
of legislation. 
Discussion
Layers of Requirements Could Impair the 
Smooth Operation of the Payments System
  Most conference participants agreed that some 
form of federal legislation will be forthcoming, but they 0    Risky Business www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
expressed concern about the compliance challenges 
that may result from additional layers of state require-
ments. Adding layer upon layer of legal and regulatory 
requirements to make electronic payments more secure 
may do little to actually improve the security of the sys-
tem but would surely create operational inefficiencies. 
Some participants argued that the key to maintaining 
the integrity of the electronic payments system is ac-
curately ascertaining, at the time an account is first 
opened, the identity of the party with whom the finan-
cial institution or other organization is doing business. 
Over-Notification
. The possibility of over-notification relating to 
security breaches was another concern participants 
generally agreed on. When is notification really neces-
sary, and how many times will a person be notified of 
the same breach? In this sense, participants argued, it 
is imperative for legislators and the industry to clearly 
define security breaches in the context of their poten-
tial effect on customers. Depending on the type of in-
formation involved, some breaches are highly unlikely 
to put consumers at risk. Notification in these cases 
is not only a cost burden, but more important, it can 
confuse consumers as to what actions to take and it 
can create unfounded anxieties. 
Law Enforcement: The Intersection of 
Electronic Payments, Fraudsters, and 
Terrorists
Moderator:  Judith Rinearson, Partner, Bryan Cave
Panelists:  Christopher Bik, Special Agent, DEA
  James Candelmo, Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney, Eastern District of North Carolina 
  Robert A. Goldfinger, Commander of 
Criminal Investigations for the Roches-
ter, NY Police Department (retired), Cer-
tified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist
  Brian D. Lamkin, Chief, Financial 
Crimes Section, Federal Bureau of 
  Investigation
Summary: Representatives of three different law enforce-
ment groups, joined by a retired police investigator, were 
unanimous in drawing a direct line between the terrorist 
events of September 11, 2001, drug trafficking, and other 
types of criminal activity and electronic commerce. They 
also were unanimous  about the cultural shifts in law en-
forcement brought about by September 11, specifically the 
willingness of the various branches of law enforcement to 
work cooperatively with each other and with the industry to 
create the extensive network required to gather and deploy 
intelligence associated with financial crime in an increas-
ingly electronic environment. All encouraged the financial 
services sector to be proactive in searching for exploitable 




  According to Candelmo, terrorist warfare 
renders traditional military responses relatively use-
less, since terrorists target entire populations, not just 
military resources. The financial services sector is a 
key target for terrorists. Although military targets are 
highly fortified, the financial backbone of the country 
is open and, therefore, vulnerable. 
  “The role of technology in aiding law enforce-
ment to identify terrorist targets—ultimately leading 
to the terrorists themselves—cannot be underrated; 
nor can the role of finances in putting together a trail 
leading to terrorists,” he stated. “Banks and their regu-
lators are in a unique and valuable position to identify 
unusual financial activity, making their service and 
support in fighting terrorism essential. The banks are 
there on the front line; the FBI isn’t, which is why the 
contributions of banks are important in combating a 
nontraditional adversary. Law enforcement now col-
lects more intelligence than ever; the challenge is to 
put together the pieces of the puzzle,” Candelmo con-
cluded. A critical piece of this puzzle is often a network 
of underlying fraudulent financial transactions, and he 
urged financial service providers to continue in their 
efforts to combat these crimes. 
Drug Enforcement Administration 
Christopher.Bik
  Bik reported that the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA) has moved beyond “just taking 
drugs off the street” to focusing on drug financing. Its 
key priority is stopping the flow of money from the 
street-level dealer in order to interrupt the financial 
flows that feed the enterprise. 
  He indicated that there are three primary ways 
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•  Driving money across the border, where it can be 
transported to its final destination. 
•  Exchanging currency on the black market (e.g., a 
foreign drug dealer converts pesos into dollars and 
dollars into pesos). 
•  Using money services businesses that cash checks, 
sell traveler’s checks, and execute wire transfers.
  According to Bik, one of the major problems 
the DEA faces is distinguishing between funds being 
transmitted abroad for legitimate reasons (e.g., support 
of family members) and funds being transmitted as 
part of drug trafficking schemes. To help differentiate 
between legitimate and illegitimate transfers, the DEA 
conducts undercover activities as part of its financial 
operations, including initiating its own money-launder-
ing schemes to identify how criminals do what they 
do and the organizations involved. This technique 
has enabled the DEA to successfully track funds up 
the money chain. Ultimately, the money goes through 
banks, which is why he said that the cooperation of the 
financial services industry is essential. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Brian.Lamkin
  Security breaches are not the specific concern 
of the FBI, but “data that is sitting out there free and 
open” is, Lamkin told the audience. Similar to the 
DEA, the goal of the FBI’s Financial Crimes Section is 
to “take down the apparatus [of the organizations that 
commit financial crimes], focusing on the enterprise 
rather than the individual violator.” 
  Furthermore, Lamkin noted, “Scams flow 
to wherever activity is being funded. For example, 
fraudulent health-care-related activity spiked when 
the Medicare drug benefit program was announced 8 
months ago. Although some fraudsters have gone high 
tech, there are still many frauds being perpetrated us-
ing low-tech techniques.” 
  From the FBI’s perspective, the most important 
step a financial institution can take to prevent crime is 
to know with whom it is doing business, especially if the 
financial institution has subsidiaries or operations that 
are national or international in scope. Financial institu-
tions’ involvement with shell corporations also concerns 
the FBI because a significant amount of fraud is being 
imported into the U.S. from Eastern Europe. 
Bridging the Gap
Robert.Goldfinger.
  According to Goldfinger, terrorist financing, 
money laundering, and fraud have changed the finan-
cial world. Advances in technology have resulted in 
a corresponding increase in risk: the increasing use of 
technology has enabled more access, and more access 
equates to more risk.
  Criminals have served as a unifying force to 
motivate the private sector and government officials 
to work together. Terrorism and other anti-American 
criminal activities have resulted in new laws and regu-
lations, setting the stage for positive cultural shifts that 
encourage coordination of efforts. 
  Goldfinger posed the question, “What can the 
financial service sector do to encourage the cultural 
shift?” and provided the following answers: 
•. Cooperation. Ensure that suspicious activity 
reports (SARs) are completed and submitted 
promptly. Conduct preliminary internal investiga-
tions, with input from legal advisors, and contact 
law enforcement with salient and/or time-sensitive 
information.
•. Coordination. Seek advice and guidance from 
within the financial industry and externally from 
law enforcement. Network to create an informal 
team that will “get the bad guys” and protect the 
financial institution and its customers.
•. Communication. Provide professional training to 
law enforcement task forces and associations. Con-
tribute material to newsletters and publications.
•. Relationships. This is a two-way street. Bankers 
have the in-depth knowledge that law enforce-
ment needs in its investigations. Law enforcement 
wants to know about the new products that finan-
cial institutions are launching; they want to know 
what’s next. Law enforcement is receptive to being 
asked to participate in the industry’s professional 
training seminars to help build a bridge of under-
standing about the issues the industry faces. 
  He also warned that financial institutions 
can be vulnerable to a variety of money laundering 
schemes, including:2    Risky Business www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
•. Placement. Introducing the illegal proceeds into 
the financial system (i.e., money structuring in ac-
counts). 
•. Layering. Converting the proceeds into a cash 
equivalent (e.g., smart card, wire transfer, or pre-
paid card).
•. Integration. Placing the funds back into the econ-
omy (i.e., mixing laundered funds in with legally 
obtained funds or other assets). 
Discussion
Foreign-Based Financial Crimes
  In response to questions about criminals based 
in foreign countries, the panelists noted that ongoing 
activity encourages the support and cooperation of 
other countries, but it is a difficult undertaking. The 
DEA works closely with a number of countries to in-
terrupt the cross-border flow of funds that supports the 
drug trade. The FBI has legal attachés in most foreign 
embassies and is placing more. The role of the attaché 
is to work with host law enforcement. In locales where 
those mechanisms are set up, there is significantly 
more cooperation among foreign counterparts. 
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)
  Although some financial service providers 
complain that there are too many SARs, the panel-
ists agreed that SARs are an important tool for law 
enforcement. The number of connections being made 
between SARs and ongoing terror investigations is sig-
nificant. The dollar figure listed on SARs is not partic-
ularly relevant to the FBI because the FBI understands 
that terrorists will attempt to stay below thresholds to 
avoid detection or to make money movements appear 
to be an insignificant credit card scam. The FBI runs 
parallel investigations. If there is an indication of true 
terrorism—rather than a purely financial fraud—teams 
are consolidated to work on the terrorist activities. 
Keynote Address – 
Risk: Another Word for Payments
Suzette Massie, President, Global Payments Consult-
ing, Carreker Corporation
Summary: The second day’s session began with a broad 
overview by Suzette Massie. Risk management organized 
around payment silos is not appropriate or effective in 
today’s highly electronified and extremely complex payments 
environment. Financial institutions must strive to move risk 
management to the enterprise level, migrating payments 
and risk management in tandem to achieve this goal. 
  According to Massie, managing payments risk 
was once a sideline of the payments business. Today, 
that has changed: 
•. Fraud.occurrences.and.types.are.exploding. 
Examples include phishing, spoofing, keystroke 
logging, account takeover, identity theft, money 
laundering, and customer data breaches. 
•. Regulation.has.mushroomed. New payment-
based regulation has come from a variety of legisla-
tion, including the Bank Secrecy Act, the Patriot 
Act, and Sarbanes-Oxley, section 0.
•. Spending.is.up. Financial institutions plan to 
spend $.8 billion on security this year, a 2 per-
cent increase over last year. 
•. Competition.is.fierce. Competition for customers, 
new products, and evolving services never ends. 
  Massie argued that, in this environment, fi-
nancial institutions can scarcely make decisions about  
the direction their payments system will take without 
considering enterprise risk each step of the way. 
Enterprise Payments and Enterprise Risk
  She emphasized that payments are now a criti-
cal part of the industry, representing a $200 billion 
business in the United States and $00 billion globally, 
and contributing 8 percent of operating income to the 
top 50 U.S. banks. 
  Traditionally, payments have operated within 
a highly fragmented structure within the banking en-
vironment, but that is changing. “Many financial in-
stitutions are now in the early stages of reorganizing to 
focus on payments, investing in image applications and 
bringing together disciplines to create a more robust 
operating environment,” she said. “Looking ahead, 
financial institutions will create payment services tai-
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est; conducting straight through processing of multiple 
payment types; automating and strategic sourcing to 
increase value, quality, and cost; embedding payment 
risk management and authorization at the point of 
presentment; and expanding products and services to 
leverage customer-valued information as an extension 
of transactions.” 
  She acknowledged that while all financial 
institutions believe it is important to break down pay-
ment silos, only half have embedded or are attempting 
to fully embed enterprise risk in their risk initiatives. 
Citing a study conducted by the Aite Group of 0 of 
the top 50 banks, she noted that 80 percent of anti-
fraud units report to a single manager and 90 percent 
do not centralize fraud detection on a single platform. 
Yet, 90 percent believe that centralized processing is 
necessary. 
Driving Factors
  Massie suggested that both legislation and 
regulation are the key drivers that necessitate the 
move to an enterprise approach to fighting fraud. 
On the national level, provisions of the Patriot Act, 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the OCC Banking 
Circular 5 (disaster recovery) require financial insti-
tutions to have a full view of their payments from an 
enterprise level. On the global level, financial institu-
tions are affected by the Basel II Accord (risk-based 
capital backing) and Sarbanes-Oxley 0 (disclosure 
and certification). In past eras, financial institutions 
addressed fraud and risk on their own terms. In today’s 
highly charged environment, much of the choice that 
financial institutions enjoyed has been taken away; 
timelines for compliance are no longer exclusively un-
der the control of financial institutions. 
  Another driver highlighted was the growing 
risk of financial loss. Attempts to defraud and losses 
from fraud are increasing, as are the types of fraud 
being perpetrated. She warned that as the massive 
transformation of payments continues (with financial 
institutions on the leading edge), larger risk gaps are 
exposed, creating opportunities for fraudsters to fill 
those gaps. Every loss or compromise deepens customer 
distrust of the system, damages reputations, and risks 
crippling fines. In addition, the publicity galvanizes leg-
islators and regulators, a situation that compounds the 
loss of control and creates greater uncertainty. 
Critical Imperatives and Possibilities
  Massie recommended that banks consider 
multiple agendas with almost every initiative they un-
dertake. She suggested that the critical items on each 
agenda will frequently merge: 
•. Agenda.one. How does this initiative affect our 
ultimate goal of merging our separate payment silos 
into a single, integrated payment business? 
•. Agenda.two. What risk control points does this 
initiative affect, open up, or cross paths with? How 
does it create new risk that we need to manage?
To illustrate her point, she posed a series of questions:
•  What are the imperatives and possibilities for fi-
nancial institutions as they seek to manage their 
migration to enterprise payments and risk while 
improving customer service and profitability? How 
do financial institutions challenge the growing per-
ception that payments are synonymous with risk? 
•  How does a financial institution protect revenue 
as it manages the two agendas? If revenue can’t be 
protected, how will it be replaced? Will financial 
institutions need to reinvent a product to sustain 
the revenue stream?
•  How does a financial institution match the pace 
of change between the two agendas when they 
overlap? What happens, for example, with an im-
age archive when you add a new partner and start 
exchanging image files? Or if a financial institution 
converts its checks to ACH, does it create a new 
risk management control point that checks ACH 
files for stop payments? 
  In general she noted that “financial institu-
tions that undertake this new way of looking at pay-
ments and risk will raise many new questions, the 
answers to which will be different depending on the 
customer segments they’re dealing with, the particular 
strategy involved, the payments infrastructure, and the 
risk management approach and technology.”
Tandem Migration 
  Massie asserted that the key is to balance the 
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ations to achieve the goal of a fully integrated payment 
system. She suggested the following tangible actions to 
achieve this goal: 
•. Lay.a.scalable,.sustainable.enterprise.founda-
tion. Leveraging existing infrastructure, focus on a 
modular customer-centric approach that  supports 
consistent access to all payment channels.
•. Lift.business.knowledge. Where is the knowledge 
base within the financial institution? What are the 
dynamics of processing transactions? Financial in-
stitutions should integrate what they know and do 
best into the new process. 
•. Identify.quick.wins. Where will changes have the 
greatest impact? Financial institutions should set 
priorities and target quick wins to deliver maxi-
mum value. 
•. Make.sure.it.works.for.both.risk.and.payments. 
Again, using the example of converting checks to 
ACH: What are the fraud-related processes and 
checkpoints that normally occur in check pay-
ments that now need to be seamlessly wound into 
ACH payments? However, as Massie explained, 
it can be more complicated. For example, what 
if a customer requests a wire transfer but does so 
over the website? It’s critical that financial insti-
tutions manage the wire risk as effectively as the 
online risk (or vice versa) and that they maintain 
consistency across both channels. Otherwise, they 
may be leaving a door open for an enterprising 
crook, trained to spot just such inconsistencies. Or 
what if a financial institution’s client elects to do 
corporate capture at its own site? The financial in-
stitution/client contract probably still calls for the 
financial institution to verify signatures and large-
item transactions, but now the information isn’t 
on the financial institution’s system; it’s on the 
client’s. What new risk control points have been 
opened? How will the financial institution ensure 
that overall risk protection is not diminished?
Conclusion
  Massie concluded her remarks by advising that 
“in the process of balancing the migration of enterprise 
payments and enterprise risk, only the fittest will survive. 
And to be the fittest requires careful, planned manage-
ment of the payments and risk marathons as in-step part-
ners in the race. The process is challenging, but it is an 
unprecedented opportunity to reinvent and rebuild.”
Identity Fraud and the Internet: 
The Best Defense and the Best Offense
Moderator:  James Van Dyke, Founder and Principal, 
Javelin Strategy & Research
Panelists:  Ravi Aurora, Vice President, Security 
and Risk Services, MasterCard 
   International
  Katherine Claypool, Senior Vice Presi-
dent, eCommerce, Bank of America
  Lisa Robinson, Vice President/Manager, 
Risk Management and Compliance, 
Wells Fargo
Summary: This session drew on one of the nation’s most 
comprehensive studies of identity fraud and addressed 
strategies for prevention, detection, and resolution. It also 
explored the Internet as a tool that can promote account 
security and how banks can use this tool to generate greater 
customer satisfaction, service, and loyalty.
  James Van Dyke opened the session using a 
sports analogy. If the Philadelphia Eagles play only 
defense, they have no chance of winning; the best the 
team can do is achieve a tie. In the world of identity 
fraud, if financial institutions only play defense with 
the goal of protecting assets, they forgo both increased 
safety and growth available through the Internet. To 
win, the industry must take a fresh look at the Inter-
net—with a clear sense of how to integrate customer 
relations, marketing, and risk management. 
  According to research conducted by Javelin 
Strategy & Research, the primary method of identity 
theft (among known-cause cases) is a lost or stolen 
checkbook or credit card (28.8 percent). The next 
most common methods are friends, family, and ac-
quaintances with access to personal information (. 
percent); corrupt employees (8. percent); non-In-
ternet purchases (8. percent); and mail fraud (8 per-
cent). Computer spyware, Internet transactions, com-
puter viruses/hackers, and phishing collectively account 
for . percent of identity theft. 
  The same study showed that using electronic 
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cantly lower losses when fraud occurs: $55 for ac-
counts monitored via ATMs, the Internet, or other 
electronic means versus $,5 for accounts monitored 
using paper statements. 
  Van Dyke cautioned that in a world with 
growing threats, the Internet can offer tremendous 
advantages, but those advantages don’t happen by 
themselves. As is the case with any delivery channel, 
the financial institution must be aware of the Internet’s 
inherent safety advantages (such as the ability to elimi-
nate access to paper delivered through the U.S. mail 
and faster detection of fraud). 
Challenges to Combating Fraud and 
Identity Theft on the Internet
Ravi.Aurora.
  In his formal remarks, Aurora emphasized 
that identity fraud places an organization’s reputation 
and brand at stake and erodes consumer confidence 
in e-commerce and online banking. He suggested that 
fraudsters challenge the abilities of legitimate organiza-
tions to combat Internet-based fraud and identity theft 
by using a combination of:
•  Social engineering and technical complexities 
to exploit browser weaknesses, resulting in fraud 
schemes such as phishing. 
•  Legitimate technologies hijacked for the purpose of 
gaining access to personal data on poorly protected 
computers to gain access to personal data.
•  Varying degrees of tolerance for e-crimes among 
law enforcement agencies and prosecutors. 
  He suggested that dealing effectively with 
Internet fraud and identity theft requires a “judicious 
blend of ‘coopetition’ [cooperation + competition] 
to go after fraudsters.” It also requires industrywide 
implementation of stronger, uniform security protocols, 
using two- or three-layer authentication methods. The 
protocol must include authentication of who you are, 
something you have, and something you know. 
  In addition, he advised the industry to take 
collective action in the following areas: 
•. E-mail.toolbars. Enhanced e-mail tools can alert 
consumers when they are receiving a suspicious 
message.
•. ISP.content.monitoring. If ISPs were more vigi-
lant in monitoring all aspects of the application 
process at enrollment, more risk could be averted 
before damage is done. 
•. Consumer.education. Many organizations have 
done a good job of educating consumers on the 
risks involved in Internet use, but more can be 
done to produce clear, up-to-date, and complete 
communications.
•. Internet.browser.enhancements. Enhancements 
are needed to warn customers of risks and prevent 
specific crimes (such as pharming or phraming). 
  He described MasterCard’s three key initia-
tives to combat Internet fraud and identity theft: 
•. SecureCode. A secret code that helps consum-
ers protect against unauthorized use of their cards 
when shopping online at participating merchants. 
•. Site.Data.Protection. Minimizes criminal access 
to consumer payment data at merchants, proces-
sors, and elsewhere. 
•. Operation.StopIT. An effort to close down web-
sites that sell or share stolen credit card infor-
mation for phishing or spoofing sites that trick 
consumers into divulging confidential information. 




  Robinson asserted that a partnership between 
businesses and customers is needed to make online 
banking and purchasing safe. Also needed is educa-
tion that uses “clear and concise communications,” 
to help customers recognize and adopt safe behaviors 
and to reinforce messages from financial institutions 
that, as confirmed in the Javelin research, online bank-
ing is safe. To give customers total assurance in this 
area, Wells Fargo offers an “online guarantee,” so that 
customers “don’t need to worry that their money is at 
risk.” 
  According to Robinson, online financial tools 
can help customers protect themselves from various 
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•. Online.banking. Allow customers to monitor 
transactions for unusual activity.
•. Bill.pay. Use e-bills to lower risk of mail fraud. 
•. Online.statements. Eliminate paper statements 
and reduce risk of mail fraud and proactively moni-
tor transactional activity.
Keystroke Logging Is the Greatest 
Online Threat
Katherine.Claypool.
  Claypool reported that the biggest fraud 
threats, according to Bank of America’s loss history, 
continue to be “new customers” and “family and 
friends.” 
  The “most odious online threat” to security 
is keystroke logging, not the more obvious phishing 
and spoofing, she noted. Focus groups conducted by 
Bank of America show that consumers have become 
increasingly savvy about phishing and spoofing scams, 
recognizing that communications are a little “off the 
mark,” and not falling for them. On the other hand, 
customers are not “practicing good computer hygiene” 
to protect themselves from keystroke logging, resulting 
in a significant growth in scams that rely on data stolen 
through illicit monitoring.  
  She noted that in focus groups, consumers 
say they update their protection every week; in real-
ity, most have allowed 0 days or more to elapse since 
their last update. Some consumers believe that it’s the 
bank’s job to protect their computers from infiltration. 
A large part of consumer education must be directed at 
fighting this perception and encouraging consumers to 
take ownership. 
  Various reports have indicated that some 0 
percent of customers who do not use online banking 
service have serious concerns about security. What will 
it take to move them online? Bank of America believes 
that it will take guarantees and assurances that the 
bank is protecting them. To address these issues, Bank 
of America recently rolled out SiteKey, a PassMark 
Security product, which will be mandatory for online 
customers by year-end. This security feature uses a 
customer-selected image that appears when customers 
log in. If they don’t see that image, they’re not dealing 
with Bank of America. If they log on from a computer 
that the bank normally doesn’t associate with them, 
the bank asks a challenge question to verify their iden-
tity. Claypool added that while many customers don’t 
necessarily understand how this technology works, 
they understand that it enhances security and view it 
positively. 
  According to Claypool, the reality is that cus-
tomers have spoken and they want to use the web. As 
proof, she noted that Bank of America processes more 
transactions through its websites than its banking cen-
ters. “The channel is here and there are security issues 
that the industry must deal with,” she concluded.
Discussion
Building Relationships with ISPs Is Key 
  In an online relationship, the customer, the 
financial institution, and the Internet service provider 
(ISP) are all points of vulnerability. Customers can-
not be compelled to take actions to protect against 
fraud, and while financial institutions are aggressively 
working to do what they can do, a key area in which 
defenses can be shored up is the ISPs. But there is a 
growing sense of optimism on this front: Conference 
participants noted increased cooperation among the 
ISPs, which have begun to realize that they must make 
certain their networks are safe. 
Need for Cross-Industry Partnerships
  If any organization is compromised, everyone 
in the payments chain suffers. There is a compelling 
need for consortia to share information. For example, 
Microsoft sponsors a financial services industry group 
that includes  major banks and Internet providers. 
The members of that group coordinate their approach 
to fraud detection, thus helping to ensure that Micro-
soft and financial service providers are synchronized in 
terms of combating online fraud. 
  Leading financial institutions are supporting 
significant initiatives to thwart phishing. Now, how-
ever, fraudsters are “moving downstream” to attack 
smaller financial institutions, which may be less able 
to respond appropriately. Much of the work to combat 
phishing so far has been done individually; the next 
step must be to work collectively to protect smaller in-
dustry participants. As one participant emphasized, “If 
one financial institution is hurt, all are hurt.” 
Difficulty of Legislative/Regulatory Solutions
  One difficulty with relying on U.S. legal or 
regulatory solutions to force institutions to act respon-
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States. One participant claimed that the majority of 
attacks now originate offshore, particularly in Eastern 
Europe and Asia. Attacks that originate in the United 
States can usually be shut down quickly. There is little 
or nothing that U.S. legislation or regulation can do to 
get to the root of the problem globally. 
  There has been a dramatic shift in where ISPs 
are located. One participant asserted that last year 80 
percent were in North America; now the fraction in 
North America is 0 percent, and 0 percent operate 
overseas. Much of this is likely due to the global spread 
of Internet usage, but many of the new providers are 
in jurisdictions with limited law enforcement agencies, 
suggesting increased criminal intent. Adding to the 
even greater complexity of global enforcement in the 
future will be the fact that in a world of about . bil-
lion people,  percent have Internet access. As com-
puters get less expensive and Internet access becomes 
more widely available, fraud will likely worsen, creating 
even more challenges for law enforcement worldwide. 
Self-Policing
  Other comments indicated that the financial 
services industry must get tougher with companies 
that broker information. Some are very reputable, but 
others are guilty of misrepresentation. GLBA is clear 
about financial institutions’ responsibilities, and some 
participants asserted that there is a need to extend 
these responsibilities to others in the information busi-
ness with access to sensitive data. 
What Can (and Cannot) Be Done?
  Suggestions for the industry included:
•  Communicate the benefits of real-time information 
to customers and help customers become accus-
tomed to working through the Internet. 
•  Figure out a way to share accountability with cus-
tomers, who have been spoiled by legal protections 
that shield the consumer from damages. Consum-
ers want financial institutions to take away all the 
risk, but people must be willing and motivated to 
protect themselves. 
•  Begin educating youth through school programs 
that focus on banking. 
•  Work with ISPs and Microsoft. 
•  Recognize that there is no silver bullet that will fix 
the problems associated with electronic payments. 
The only option is to work together to send con-
sistent messages, such as: If you don’t know who is 
sending an e-mail, don’t download it!  
Checks: How to Manage the Risk When 
the Paper Disappears
Moderator:  Blake Prichard, Executive Vice Presi-
dent, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia
Panelists:  Susan Robertson, Assistant Vice Presi-
dent, Retail Payments Office, Federal 
  Reserve Bank of Atlanta
  Louise L. Roseman, Director, Division of 
Reserve Bank Operations and Payment  
Systems, Federal Reserve Board of 
  Governors
  Sydney Smith Hicks, President, 
  VECTORsgi
Summary: Checks are being replaced by electronic pay-
ments. While almost everyone acknowledges the many 
benefits of moving from a paper-based payment system to 
a faster, more efficient electronic one, the shift significantly 
alters the risk environment for financial institutions. Laws 
and risk management techniques hammered out over de-
cades to provide security in a paper-based environment do 
not necessarily translate into the electronic world. As check 
replacement products continue to grow in usage and popu-
larity, how will they affect risk? 
Check 21 
Louise.Roseman
  Roseman set the stage for her remarks by sug-
gesting that it’s important to consider three key points 
when examining the evolution of Check 2: 
•. Trends.in.electronic.payment.usage..For noncash 
retail payments, electronic payments now exceed 
check payments. 
•. What.Check.21.does.and.does.not.do..Check 2 
authorizes substitute checks, in effect substituting 
paper for paper. Although Check 2 does not autho-
rize electronic payment, which is still accomplished 
only by agreement among the parties, it facilitates 8    Risky Business www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
electronic payments by allowing banks to truncate 
original checks. 
•. Early.Check.21.experiences..Check 2 took ef-
fect on October 28, 200, with the strong support 
of Congress and the financial industry. (The legis-
lation received no negative votes.) No banks are 
required to use the authority granted under Check 
2, but banks are free to do so according to their 
business interests. 
  In June 2005, the Reserve Banks processed 
approximately 00,000 checks daily under Check 2, 
about  percent of checks collected and 0 percent 
of dollars.2   To date, the demand to deposit checks 
electronically has been stronger than the demand to 
receive image presentments. Why aren’t more banks 
using Check 2? In some cases, the business case is not 
yet there; technology investments, including systems 
and software, must be made to leverage the author-
ity. Software is a challenge: bugs are still being worked 
out. Roseman noted that the slow and steady start has 
allowed all parties to work through new processes and 
make appropriate adjustments that might not have 
been possible with a full cutover on day one. 
Check 21 Risks
  Roseman then turned her attention to the 
risks posed by Check 2: 
•. Duplicate.checks. There is only one original 
check, but once the original check is truncated, 
multiple images or multiple substitute checks could 
exist. Banks must ensure that they have internal 
controls to prevent the transfer of duplicate items. 
•. Physical.security.features. Many original checks 
have built-in security features, such as watermarks 
or micro-printing, that don’t survive the transition 
to substitute checks. Roseman expects that better, 
image-survivable security features will likely be 
created in the future. Examples include seal en-
coding and 2D bar encoding.
•. Nonbank.truncation..A bank may give customers 
the right to truncate checks, but the risk must be 
evaluated. For example, if a bank permits its non-
bank customer to create substitute checks, it must 
provide the associated Check 2 warranties on 
behalf of the customer..
  Under Check 2, the bank that creates the 
substitute check generally bears the liability. The idea 
is that since the bank is realizing the benefit, it should 
be responsible for internalizing the risk. If a bank in-
curs a loss from a substitute check that it wouldn’t 
have incurred with a paper check, it may pass through 
the loss to the bank that created the substitute check.
Expectations
  In terms of what the industry could expect as a 
result of Check 2, Roseman indicated that the declin-
ing number of checks has already caused a reduction 
in the number of Reserve Bank check processing loca-
tions. In 2002, there were 5 locations. By the end of 
200, there will be fewer than half that number. The 
“tipping point” for Check 2 will occur between 200 
and 200, she suggested. By that time, a substantial 
number of banks will have made the investment in 
in-house technology or formed arrangements through 
service providers to deposit and accept checks elec-
tronically. She expects that this will lead to a substan-
tial restructuring of physical transportation networks. 
Unpaid checks that are handled electronically will be 
returned to the depository bank faster, but others that 
continue to be handled in paper form may take longer 
to return.
  Roseman noted that projections with a longer 
timeline are more speculative and “a topic of spirited 
debate within the Fed.” She offered her own personal 
prediction, which she emphasized is not an official 
Fed position: A decade from now, Reserve Banks will 
only handle checks electronically, and any checks that 
continue to be cleared in paper form will be cleared 
outside the Federal Reserve.  
  She also offered the following potential impli-
cations of this scenario: 
•  One Federal Reserve check processing region.
•  All checks nationwide will be deemed local checks, 
subject to a two-day maximum hold period.
•  Unpaid checks will be returned to depository 
2 The numbers cited by Roseman were accurate at the time of pre-
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banks faster, but not fast enough to protect deposi-
tory banks from fraud risk.
Conclusion
  “Over time Check 2 should lead to a much 
more electronic and efficient check collection system,” 
Roseman concluded. “This change will be evolution-
ary, not revolutionary, with the transition being market 
driven. The transition will reduce some risks, while 
increasing others. And, at the end of the day, check 
collection will be similar to ACH—with pictures.”
Assessing ACH Risk and Solutions
Susan.Robertson.
  Robertson indicated that the Federal Reserve 
will soon launch a new service to assist originating de-
pository financial institutions (ODFIs) to mitigate their 
fraud exposure by monitoring and controlling third-
party and originator access to the ACH network. 
Background 
  Addressing the origin of the new service, she 
noted that a series of meetings with bankers, followed 
by nationwide focus groups and consultations with ad-
visory groups, identified ACH-related risk as a poten-
tial “hidden iceberg” for financial institutions. There 
was strong consensus among meeting and focus group 
participants that it is appropriate and desirable for the 
Fed to play a role in mitigating ACH risk. On the basis 
of these findings, the Fed, which provides operator ser-
vices to more than 2,000 ACH participants and pro-
cesses two-thirds of forward commercial ACH volume, 
determined that it could and should address risk miti-
gation, consistent with its role as an ACH operator. 
  According to Robertson, the relatively new 
ACH WEB (Internet-initiated) and TEL (telephone-
initiated) services are key areas of risk for ODFIs, since 
they are the ones responsible for warranting the valid-
ity of ACH transactions.
FedACH Risk Origination Monitoring Service
  Robertson reported that in response to these 
key risk areas, the Fed created and tested the FedACH 
Risk Origination Monitoring Service.  The service en-
ables ODFIs to determine:
•  Which originators it wants to monitor (e.g., origi-
nators operating in high-risk businesses, with a 
high percentage of returns or high activity/dollar 
volumes, and with poor audit results)
•  The monitoring criteria (e.g., daily caps, batch 
caps, or number of debits) it wants to employ 
  ODFIs enter the monitoring criteria to the 
FedACH Information Services via FedLine Web or 
FedLine Advantage™ and send files to FedACH Ser-
vices to conduct risk monitoring at the batch level or 
within the FedACH application. The Fed responds 
with near real-time e-mail notices of pended batches 
to the ODFI. The ODFI takes action on the pended 
batches, either rejecting or releasing via FedACH. The 
batches remaining at the end of the day are processed 
or rejected according to the end-of-day default. Ser-
vice features include: 
•  ODFIs administer their own risk management 
criteria and may select from a variety of service op-
tions.
•  Pre-set criteria include debit and/or credit caps for 
one or more originators across ODFI RTM, end-
of-day default to either reject or process batches, 
and monitoring over process day or exposure days.
•  ODFIs determine in near real time whether to pro-
cess or reject pended batches.
•  E-mail notification of pended batches may be ac-
cessed by multiple recipients.
  “The risk service, which is expected to be in 
full production in the first quarter of 200, is available 
to any bank that originates ACH payments processed 
by FedACH Services,” Robinson noted. “Participating 
in the service is independent of the bank’s ACH opera-
tor relationship. It is a value-added, priced service, and 
its use is not mandatory.” 
A Changing Risk Environment 
Sydney.Smith.Hicks
  Hicks characterized Check 2 as “the biggest 
operational change in payment processing since the 
introduction of the MICR line” and suggested that 
Check 2 will change the payments risk model in sig-
nificant ways:
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operational change enabled by Check 2, will en-
able lower cost geographic expansion but will alter 
check fraud dynamics, initially increasing risks 
(new operators, new physical locations, new back-
up plans, new customers), but ultimately decreas-
ing risk as reengineered processes are introduced. 
Day 2 processes will move into Day . 
•. New.product.risk. Hicks anticipated that im-
age replacement documents (IRDs) will be used 
more often in the early stages of Check 2 adop-
tion, since some banks will not be able to accept 
electronic presentment. The creation of IRDs, or 
substitute checks, means that the creating bank 
provides warranties and indemnification, unless re-
sponsibilities are shifted by agreements among the 
parties. Faced with this risk, banks creating IRDs/
substitute checks, Hicks argued, should consider 
strengthening account agreements and installing 
systems to detect duplicate items. 
Changing Risk 
. During the last decade, she noted, financial 
institutions have invested millions of dollars each year 
to address check fraud; yet, fraud losses have remained 
stable during the past several years and are still a sig-
nificant problem. Losses for large banks have trended 
downward as they have deployed technology. Fraud 
losses are not trending downward at smaller banks. 
  Hicks identified the major types of check fraud 
(kiting, counterfeit checks, alterations, forged endorse-
ments, forged signatures, NSF/uncollected funds, 
closed accounts, and stop payments) and suggested 
that Check 2 will alter the dynamics of four of these 
types: counterfeit checks, alterations, forged endorse-
ments, and forged signatures. While some analysts sug-
gest that kiting will go away, she suggested the reality 
is that the existing paper process will work more slowly 
as banks cut back on the frequency of courier pickups. 
As a result of the uneven implementation of Check 2 
and the slower movement of the paper, losses from kit-
ing—in the short term—may increase, as kiters move 
to banks that adopt Check 2 more slowly. 
  Hicks predicted that the adoption of Check 
2 will have a variety of consequences in terms of 
preventing check fraud. In some situations, Check 2 
offers a positive advantage on existing techniques; in 
others it is neutral; and in some situations it makes 
check fraud prevention more difficult:
•. Positive.effect..The following techniques become 
more effective with the use of images. In the case 
of positive pay, the payee’s name can be verified 
from the image and compared to the issue file. 
Images processed at the teller line can be verified 
immediately before cash leaves the teller station. 
Reverse positive pay (where the customer monitors 
the items before they are paid) is possible due to 
the ease of making images available online. Im-
mediate scanning of images combined with new 
processing algorithms will make fraud detection 
quicker and more effective for a larger number of 
items:
-  Rules-based system for on-us items
-  Rules-based system for deposited items
-  Signature verification
-  Positive pay
-  Reverse positive pay
-  Image-based fraud detection
•. Neutral.effect:.
-  MICR detection
-  Shared account information databases
-  New account opening/tracking 
•. Negative.effect..Physical security properties of pa-
per checks do not carry over to an IRD or imaged 
environment. These features include thermochro-
matic ink, copy void pantographs, watermarks, laid 
line, microprinting, and chemical reactive papers.
Other Risk Mitigation Enhancements
  Hicks also indicated that Check 2 offers ad-
ditional risk mitigation benefits not available in tradi-
tional paper check-based processing: 
•. Anti-money.laundering. The technology that 
makes it possible to recognize handwriting on a 
check makes it possible to compare the payee in-
formation on a check to the OFAC list to enable 
identification, tracking, research, and documenta-
tion. 
•. Immediately.available.images. Because images are 
available immediately, research into check kiting 
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The Biggest Change in 30 Years
  Hicks concluded her remarks by summarizing 
her views on the long-term effects of Check 2:
•  Traditional process clearing times may increase as 
dedicated plane transportation arrangements are 
cancelled, increasing the risks to old processes and 
products. 
•  Distributed processing is the new reality, with the 
ability to move into new markets.
•  Movement into new markets means more classic 
“know your customer” challenges.
•  There are significant new processes to manage. 
•  The increased availability of images gives bankers 
new powers to reengineer and mitigate fraud risks.
Data and Information Security: 
It’s More Than Money
Moderator:. Rahul Gupta, Senior Vice President, Risk 
Management, EFT Delivery Services, 
  eFunds
Panelists:  Tom Kellermann, Senior Data Risk Man-
agement Specialist, World Bank
  Mark MacCarthy, Senior Vice President, 
Visa USA 
  Stuart Pratt, President, Consumer Data 
Industry Association 
Summary: Data and information are never more secure 
than the weakest link in the access chain. In the highly 
interconnected and competitive world of payments process-
ing, that access chain is large and growing. Not all players 
stand ready to accept their responsibility to adequately safe-
guard the data and information they use and collect. Real 
industry-initiated solutions are needed to provide security 
and protect the reputation of the industry and its individual 
members.
  As a launching point for a discussion on data 
and information security, moderator Rahul Gupta 
framed the topic and the issues by asserting that data 
today are the equivalent of gold and currency in old 
economies. Much is protected, but much isn’t—espe-
cially data that are accessible because of the Internet 
and the interconnectedness of financial institutions, 
processors, and other service providers. The central is-
sues of data and information security are access control 
and where the internal and external gaps are. 
  Gupta identified the types of data relevant to 
this discussion as: 
Sensitive.Personal.Information..
- Customer’s name       
- Address         
- Telephone number       
- Social Security number
- Taxpayer ID number
- Driver’s license number
Sensitive.Account.Information
- Consumer’s credit card number
- Debit card number
- Other financial account numbers
  Sensitive data are maintained—and lost—by a 
variety of organizations, including government, service 
entities (such as universities and hospitals), financial 
services organizations, payments networks, and third-
party service providers (such as data brokers and credit 
reporting agencies). 
  Gupta said that data may be lost in a host of 
ways through a variety of channels:
•. ATM. Skimming, employee theft, trapping.
•. Internet/PC. Phishing, spamming, hacking.
•. Physical. Dumpster diving, employee theft, mail 
theft, contractor theft.
•. POS. Skimming, employee theft.
•. Wireless. Spamming, employee theft, trapping.
  Although data loss does not necessarily trans-
late into fraudulent events, it sets the stage for illicit 
activities, including fraudulent account openings, 
counterfeiting, accessing consumer data, and altering 
data. Although the direct correlation between data loss 
and fraud is never known, it is known that data loss 
has been on the increase and so has fraud. To empha-
size the point, he noted that: •  Identity theft is the number one growth crime, ac-
cording to the FBI.
•  Computer crime has increased ,00 percent since 
99.
•  9. million people in the United States have been 
the victims of identity theft during the past two 
years.
•  5 percent of hack attacks target banks.
•  8 percent of financial institutions experienced a 
compromise last year.
•  Reported computer intrusions at U.S. banks in-
creased five-fold during 200.
  According to Gupta, one of the many serious 
implications of the increase in data loss and fraudu-
lent activities is the loss of consumer trust in online 
systems. Companies pay a price for security breaches. 
The Wall Street Journal studied  companies in which 
a breach occurred. In 0 out of , the stock price 
declined an average of . percent the day after the 
breach became public and was down an average of 5.0 
percent in the weeks and months following—a real 
loss to stockholders. As noted in an earlier panel, there 
are known relationships between identity theft, drug 
running, and organized crime—leading to further repu-
tational loss for organizations and increased consumer 
mistrust of the financial system. 
  What is the industry’s response to the chal-
lenge of securing data? 
  Gupta offered the eFunds board of directors as 
an example of the industry’s concern for data security, 
indicating that it “wants direct reports on data secu-
rity—not just around physical and logical access con-
trol, but also organizational control, ownership, best 
practices for employees, and vetting customers and 
vendors. 
  “Businesses are just beginning to deal with these 
issues, particularly focusing on who within the organi-
zation is accountable,” he continued. “Solutions will 
emerge as businesses create the right incentive struc-
tures and as the right legislation is put in place. On a 
scale of one to 0, the industry is only at a one or two in 
terms of doing what needs to be done to protect data.” 
  At the conclusion of his remarks, Gupta di-
rected questions to the panelists:
•. What.is.the.government.doing.with.respect.to.
data.security?
  Mark MacCarthy noted that many organiza-
tions that save sensitive consumer data are not 
covered by the requirements of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (GLBA), as financial institutions and 
others in financial services are. A key legislative 
goal is to make security and safekeeping require-
ments uniform across the board, because the real-
ity is that some merchants and processors do not 
live up to the rules in place. 
  He also noted that nonsecure businesses 
are an obvious target for criminal organizations, 
“The companies have already aggregated the data 
they’re after.” 
  Stuart Pratt reiterated MacCarthy’s concern 
about the “unevenness” of the regulatory environ-
ment; some data aggregators are covered by GLBA 
and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and some are 
not. He noted that a name, address, and Social Se-
curity number are “different from what they used 
to be.” They’re now accessible on the web and are 
not commonly used on their own to verify identity. 
•. What.are.the.key.gaps.in.data.security?.
  Tom Kellermann identified key gaps in secur-
ing data:
-. Identity.management. In e-finance, financial 
institutions face the challenge of knowing the 
parties with whom they’re doing business.
-. Factor.identity.not.in.place. Too often senior 
management is not aware of what the CIO is 
doing, and the company’s activities are creat-
ing opportunities for data loss and putting the 
company’s reputation on the line. 
-. Dynamic.information.security.policies. 
Again, too often they are not in place.
-. Wireless. Wireless and the use of wireless in 
e-brokerage are highly problematical, creating 
an increase in online e-brokerage fraud. 
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•. Can.you.comment.on.internal.risk.and.employ-
ee.theft?
. MacCarthy indicated that Visa shares its se-
curity rules, including employee requirements and 
controls, with other entities to promote a secure 
environment, but employees always present a point 
of vulnerability. In addition, one of the key sources 
of internal risk is saving data. Some merchants 
save data, including security data, without know-
ing they’re doing it; they do it because the software 
they purchased was designed that way. Vendors 
know how to fix this vulnerability and are now de-
veloping software that does not save inappropriate 
data, but legacy systems remain—creating a large, 
ongoing problem. Visa mandates that security 
codes not be saved; going forward, it will require 
merchants and processors to use point-of-sale soft-
ware applications that do not save security codes. 
It’s essential to gain the cooperation of merchants 
and processors to combat internal risk and em-
ployee theft.
  Kellermann noted that 0 percent of computer 
fraud is internal, but one out of every three com-
puters is compromised. The real problem is not the 
employee, but the digital outsider. According to 
an OECD study, one out of every three comput-
ers is hijacked. These zombie PCs allow hackers to 
infiltrate secure enclaves and siphon out personal 
data and access controls. The way to address this 
situation is to mandate two-factor authentication, 
as defined by the FDIC and the OCC; to continu-
ally conduct penetration and vulnerability assess-
ments; and to be proactive in addressing software 
vulnerabilities. He also noted that PCs that have 
been compromised present an ongoing problem be-
cause old worms create backdoor tunnels. Most of 
today’s worms reverse-engineer backdoors created 
in systems by yesterday’s malicious code. This phe-
nomenon is possible because most organizations do 
not hunt for the backdoors placed in systems as a 
result of electronic intrusion.
  Pratt elaborated on the threat presented by 
digital insiders, expressing his concern for back-
ground screening standards and practices, as well 
as the private sector’s inability to access criminal 
records to use in the evaluation of potential em-
ployees. 
•. Are.there.national.security.issues.involved?
  Pratt responded that identity validation is 
a homeland security issue. The Real ID Act of 
2005—which proposes standardized, electronically 
readable driver’s licenses—is supposed to solve all 
identity-related issues in the United States. But, 
he noted, it also raises fears about ushering in what 
amounts to a national ID card and creating a false 
sense of security because it eliminates other forms 
of identification. 
  MacCarthy noted that the FDIC is pushing 
for federal guidance on two-factor identification 
(such as including an image for online validation), 
focusing on preventing phishing. Is the person who 
is coming back to your financial institution the 
person you enrolled? He added that while it may 
seem to be unattractive to be subject to agency 
mandates, the industry appears to be moving in 
that direction. 
Discussion
  The follow-up discussion focused on whether 
security issues had become so overwhelming that the 
industry should move away from the magnetic stripe as 
the standard for card-based transactions. A variety of 
viewpoints related to this and other issues were offered 
by panelists and the audience: 
•. Mark.MacCarthy: Neural networks complement 
magnetic stripe cards to significantly enhance se-
curity. Does a cost-benefit analysis indicate that 
there is enough of an advantage to put in new de-
vices at the point of sale?
•. Richard.Parry: The issue is more fundamental. In 
the UK, the vast majority of financial institutions 
are issuers and acquirers, enabling them to see the 
payments business holistically. Ever since issuers 
and acquirers have been fragmented in the United 
States, the acquirer wags the dog. A change in in-
terchange is needed to drive positive change.
•. Ron.Congemi: The only way to accomplish what 
needs to be done is to provide incentives.
•. Paul.Tomasofsky: The issue is what the industry 
as a whole will pay for the transaction—issuers, 
acquirers, consumers, and merchants. If the level 
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margins will come down. In an environment with 
falling margins, costs associated with increased 
losses caused by inadequate risk mitigation eat into 
the dwindling profit margins. The lower margin 
players will exit the business, while the well-run 
ones will thrive. Effective, efficient risk mitigation 
by the survivors will become a sustainable competi-
tive advantage.
Best Practices: Industry Sector Recom-
mendations for a Secure Electronic 
Payment Environment
Moderator:. Jean Bruesewitz, Senior Vice President, 
Visa USA
Panelists:  Ron Congemi, Senior Vice President, 
Strategic Industry Relations, FDC
  Robb Evans, Managing Director, 
  Account and Risk Solutions, eFunds
  Richard Parry, Senior Vice President, 
JPMorganChase 
  Rodman K. Reef, Chairman & CEO, 
Citishare Corp., a Citigroup subsidiary
Summary: In this culminating session, five industry ex-
perts—representing different parts of the electronic pay-
ments industry—offered best practices to secure the system. 
Although segments were addressed individually, all agreed 




  Bruesewitz noted that electronic payments 
offer consumers incredible convenience and financial 
institutions the opportunity to generate incremental 
income. They also present significant new challenges 
to the industry in the form of new types of fraud. Ef-
fective risk management has always been an important 
part of the banking equation, and today it is even more 
critical to preserve consumer confidence in the system. 
While, as an industry, we have made many advances in 
risk management, there continues to be room for im-
provement. 
Then and Now
  “How has the proliferation of electronic pay-
ments changed the risk environment?” Bruesewitz 
asked. In the past, risk management was relatively 
straightforward. There was a single demand deposit ac-
count (DDA) and a single access device—the check. 
Multi-day processing provided a cushion of time in 
which to detect and deter fraud. Today’s environment 
is exceedingly more complex. There is still one DDA, 
but it may be accessed in many ways: paper checks, 
checks converted at the point of sale, check cards, 
ATMs, ACH debits, and online banking and bill pay-
ment. Electronic processing reduces or eliminates the 
processing time cushion and the virtual world presents 
its own set of risks. 
  She noted that in the 2st century, consum-
ers are taking advantage of the convenience of all the 
ways they can access their accounts. Debit continues to 
grow in all of its manifestations, as do card-not-present 
and e-commerce transactions. Check use continues to 
decline, and fraudsters continue to attempt to exploit 
the payments system. Electronic payments are a natural 
target for several reasons. First, improved fraud detec-
tion in older channels encourages fraudsters to pursue 
opportunities in new channels. Second, technology 
provides fraudsters with tools to attack the payments 
system in new ways, such as hacking and phishing. 
Evolving Fraud Detection Needs
  Bruesewitz contended that to remain effective, 
fraud detection must evolve to address today’s chal-
lenges. This requires moving beyond identifying fraud 
simply at the transaction and account levels (as neural 
networks do quite effectively) and creating capabilities 
to detect fraud horizontally—across the payment sys-
tem—at the event level. For example, if fraud detection 
focuses only on the account level, a $ fraud might go 
unnoticed—even if that fraud is perpetrated against 
0 million accounts. If fraud detection expands at the 
event level, it is possible to identify a $ fraud perpe-
trated 0 millions times based on a change in activity 
among a large number of accounts. 
  Visa is building a new risk management in-
frastructure that addresses both payments system risk 
and account risk. A significant part of the new infra-
structure is identifying the “first instance of fraud,” the 
initial fraud transaction (prior to the pattern of fraud 
developing), and “single ping fraud,” a single instance 
of fraud within an account. Visa has introduced signifi-
cant new capabilities that allow decisions to be made 
in real time and that add risk intelligence to all of the 
authorizations processed through VisaNet. 
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Debit Best Practices
  Bruesewitz highlighted debit best practices for 
issuers, including: 
•  Using application risk tools to support new ac-
count processes.
•  Maintaining an effective card distribution and ac-
tivation process.
•  Providing an online authentication program such 
as Verified by Visa.
•  Actively managing cardholder authorizations:
-  Continuously updating balance files.
-  Using expiration date/CVV/CVV2 in decisions 
about authorization.
-  Using fraud detection tools.
-  Managing stand-in parameters.
•  Implementing effective fraud case management 
and loss recovery practices.
•  Tracking fraud and report fraud internally, to your 
processor, and to your card organizations.
Pin-Based Products
Ron.Congemi.
  “Fraud has not gone away, but it’s moved—to 
the second, third, and fourth tier financial institu-
tions,” asserted Congemi. “Large organizations—such 
as eFunds, FDC, and Visa—have moved as fast as they 
can and have taken on as much as they can to ad-
dress fraud, but it’s not a fair fight. All we can do is try 
to keep up the best we can.” The worm in the apple 
analogy is a good one, he noted. “You can get rid of 
the worm, but you can’t patch up the damage that was 
done—particularly when that damage involves reputa-
tional loss. 
  “If the industry doesn’t think that fraud is a 
problem, the consumer certainly does—with the press 
sensationalizing every event,” he contended. “The in-
dustry can’t be satisfied with fraud at five basis points, 
because that’s five basis points of a huge pie. The abso-
lute dollar figure we’re talking about is large enough to 
justify an investment in change.” 
Identity Theft
  According to Congemi, identify theft and 
identity-related fraud continue to grow: Approximately 
 million adults reported instances of identity theft 
in 200, up from 2 million in 200. When consum-
ers were asked when identity theft occurred, their re-
sponses have been consistent over several years’ time, 
suggesting that identity theft continues despite efforts 
to combat it. 
  He identified frauds that contribute to identity 
theft: 
•. Phishing..Approximately  percent of adults 
(about 9 million) have received a phishing e-mail 
or phone call. An estimated 5 percent of consum-
ers contacted by phishing fraudsters provided the 
requested personal information. Forty-five percent 
of victimized adults (approximately 2 million) re-
port that the personal information provided was 
used to make an unauthorized transaction, open 
an account, or commit another type of identity 
theft. In the first quarter of 2005, the instances of 
phishing far exceeded the total for all of 200.
•. Skimming..Skimming—when cards are com-
promised by devices that read and record mag-
netic stripe and, possibly, PIN information—also 
continues to threaten consumers’ identities and 
accounts. Skimming devices include PC-based sys-
tems, which are readily available for sale, that can 
be connected to POS terminals and counterfeit or 
compromised ATMs. 
Best Practices
  Congemi offered suggestions for what financial 
institutions can do to protect themselves and custom-
ers from PIN-based fraud: 
•  Operate cameras at all ATMs.
•  Monitor ATM activity:
-  Card reader and dispenser errors.
-  PIN entry timeouts.
-  Changes in transaction patterns.
-  No transaction activity periods.
•  Perform daily physical inspections of branch 
ATMs.
•  Tell consumers to contact their financial institu-
tion if they suspect phishing or ATM tampering.2    Risky Business www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
•  Perform due diligence on nonbank-owned ATMs.
•  Use card-based PIN offsets and validate offsets in 
the authorization process.
•  Check CVV/CVC during authorization of PIN 
transactions and monitor CVV mismatch activity.
•  Use neural network fraud detection systems.
•  Report fraud.
•  Conduct velocity checks on bad PIN transactions.
•  Implement a card activation process.
•  Confirm address changes.
•  Separate card and PIN mailers.
•  Don’t use PIN for VRU or online banking.
Educate Customers to Reduce Victimization
  “Most important,” Congemi concluded, “pro-
vide education to help consumers identify fraudulent 
schemes before they’re victimized.” 
ACH Transactions
Robb.Evans.
  As check use is declining, payment transac-
tions are being moved into a variety of alternative ve-
hicles, such as debit cards, electronic bill presentment 
and payment (EBPP), and check conversion (not sub-
stitution) at the point of sale, stated Evans. The latter 
two are examples of new payment vehicles that have 
necessitated development of new types of ACH pay-
ments, creating a hybrid situation from a risk manage-
ment point of view. He argued that it is incumbent on 
all members of the industry to work together to man-
age these new payment types and their associated risk. 
Organizational Silos Deter Effective 
Risk Management
  Evans contended that although financial in-
stitutions have done a good job at combating fraud, 
they’ve done it within organizational silos, creating an 
inefficient process that increases costs, fails to leverage 
fraud-related lessons, and encourages fraudsters to fo-
cus attention on the weakest part of the system. Banks 
have a unique opportunity to use this transition period 
from paper to electronic processing to begin managing 
fraud on an enterprise level by: 
•  Integrating siloed payments processing and fraud 
management infrastructure.
•  Managing data across the entire account and 
transaction life cycle.
•  Integrating internal and external sources of data 
and analytics for making decisions in real time.
•  Investing in real-time solutions and flexible infra-
structure.
•  Automating back-office manual processes to inte-
grate more effectively with front office.
•  Migrating operations gradually to mitigate costs, 
balancing the risks and rewards of technology 
change.
Framework for Success
  Evans noted that many parties are involved in 
any ACH payment transaction: the originator, banks 
(ODFI and RDFI), receiver, and possibly other pro-
cessing intermediaries. Each plays an integral role in 
handling the payment; each has an opportunity and 
the responsibility to manage the risk associated with 
that payment; and each has certain obligations under 
NACHA rules. Effective measures for meeting these 
obligations and using industry best practices lead to a 
solid and secure payments framework. New payment 
types have created a need for each entity to go a step 
beyond what was required for handling traditional 
ACH payments, such as direct deposit of payroll, and 
recurring debit transactions, such as insurance pre-
miums. As payment usage grows in both breadth and 
depth, increased diligence is required to address in-
creased payment risk.
ACH Best Practices: New Payment Types 
  Evans identified ACH best practices for new 
payment types:
•. WEB/TEL.(Internet-.and.Telephone-Initiated.
Entries)..Consumer-initiated transactions via the 
phone and the Internet continue to grow. Often Risky Business    2  www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
these payments are single-usage payments (e.g., to 
make a purchase). The nonrecurring nature of the 
transaction and the relative anonymity of the ini-
tiator create additional potential risk.  
-. Obligations.of.Originators. Agreement with 
ODFIs; authorization requirements; risk man-
agement, including implementing a fraudu-
lent-transaction detection system, verifying 
routing numbers, providing security to Internet 
session, auditing website security. 
-. Responsibilities.of.ODFIs. Agreements with 
originators, provision of warranties and liabili-
ties, and formatting requirements.
•. ARC.(Accounts.Receivable.Check.Conversion)..
The conversion of consumer-to-biller remittance 
payments in lockbox operations has created tre-
mendous new volume of ACH payments. The 
volume and hybrid nature of these transactions 
(originated as paper checks written.by consumers, 
converted into electronic ACH items by the bill-
ers) create additional potential risk:
-  Provide biller/bank with additional risk mitiga-
tion by reducing exposure created by re-open-
ing credit lines based on fraudulent payments 
(bust-out fraud).
•  BOC.(Back-Office.Check.Conversion). 
  NACHA is exploring/piloting a way for merchants 
to convert checks received at the point-of-sale 
into electronic ACH items. Like ARC, this form 
of check conversion would generate new volume 
of a hybrid nature into the ACH network, thereby 
creating potential new risk.
-  Place holds on funds pending presentment.
-  Hold the resubmission of a returned item until 
the merchant has verified that the funds are in 
the consumer’s account.
-  Conduct risk-weighted transaction scoring to 
identify the relative risk of an item and to use 
as parameters in determining how to clear the 
item.
-  Consider offering a service to merchants to 
address the “unknown” MICR lines, i.e., those 
not found in databases currently used to verify 
checks.
  In summary, Evans argued that these new pay-
ment types may actually reduce the total risk in the 
financial system because, in many cases, ACH pay-
ments—by nature of their speed of collection—create 
less risk than checks and other payment alternatives. 
Nonetheless, the convergence of payment media and 
the growth of the ACH network as a primary medium 
require all entities handling ACH transactions (as an 
originator, receiver, or payment intermediary) to en-
hance their ACH risk mitigation processes.
Exercise the Model 
Rodman.Reef.
  According to Reef, one of the most critical—
and often overlooked—elements of safeguarding the 
integrity of electronic payments is for all participants 
to know the rules and to follow through by complying 
with or enforcing the rules, as appropriate. The gover-
nance structure is important to fraud prevention. 
  “The electronic payments business is interest-
ing because sometimes organizations that make the 
rules don’t operate the system,” he stated. “In the 
recent CardSystems security breach, for example, 
banks were not named in the press releases— Visa and 
MasterCard were. But Visa and MasterCard didn’t hire 
that processor; they had agreements with the banks 
that hired CardSystems and did not have a direct way 
to enforce the rules, which was the responsibility of the 
banks.”
  He argued that it is the responsibility of pay-
ment system operators to hold participants account-
able: Ensure that all direct members actively pursue 
their roles and provide direction about “what is ex-
pected” and “how it is measured.” If a bank is partici-
pating directly in a payment system, it must know its 
responsibilities and those of the other participants. In 
addition, users of a payment system must understand 
each participant’s role. 
  “As the financial services industry explores 
every opportunity to reduce fraud,” he concluded, “it 
must understand that problems can be avoided if all 
participants know the rules, exercise the model, and 
perform the roles that they have accepted for their or-
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Financial Institutions 
Richard.Parry.
  Parry indicated that it is necessary for financial 
services firms to think about risk systematically and to 
think about risk as a process that can be made better at 
every juncture. 
  “How you define fraud—the cause, the ef-
fect, and the remedy—is also important, because your 
definition of fraud determines how you will fix it. Bad 
definitions can lead you to attempt to solve the wrong 
problem,” he continued. “When the industry addresses 
payment risk, there are hundreds of problems to be 
solved: Some need to be fixed in granular ways, some 
tactically, some through policy oversight, and some 
through systems. There must be a whole framework of 
control; there is no silver bullet from any vendor.” 
  Parry reiterated the frequently heard com-
plaint, “Your data is out there,” and advised the 
industry “to get over it,” because it is irresponsible 
to manage risk under any other assumption. “In this 
business, there is always another risk coming along,” 
he suggested. “Getting hypertension over it doesn’t ac-
complish anything. Defect analysis is critical to devel-
oping focused solutions to well-understood problems. 
To conduct defect analysis properly requires experi-
enced professionals with comprehensive skills in risk 
management, process, operations, audit, and computer 
security. Fraud must be managed and measured. The 
prevailing standard of security will always be breached 
in time, as the technology to build it becomes cheaper 
and more accessible to those who seek to breach it. 
Thus, it’s a process of constant and relentless improve-
ment.”
The “Gold Standard” Lock on the Door 
  Parry asked the audience to assume that the 
“gold standard” lock is on the door to financial data. 
Then, he asked two questions and elaborated on the 
significance of the questions:
•  “How do we know to whom we are giving the keys 
if there is no way of uniquely identifying the par-
ties?” It’s not just a question of being entitled to 
access, but how do we know that the person with 
the key is the person to whom it was issued. 
•  “How do we know if that person is who he claims 
to be?” Identity (the person our mothers know us 
to be) is too readily confused with identification (a 
credential that identifies us for society’s purposes, 
including payments, billing, and settlements) and 
authentication (a means by which we can prove 
that we are entitled to have access to something or 
to be somewhere). 
  Parry contended that the industry has an au-
thentication problem in need of a solution. “And it’s 
more than a technology challenge; the industry must 
balance the individual consumer’s rights and need for 
privacy against society’s, and our institutions need to 
differentiate themselves from each other.” 
  To date, no two-factor identification solution 
is ready for prime time, according to Parry. Most solu-
tions only address one product or channel, not the 
multiple channel/multiple product relationships that 
are identity critical.
Means, Motive, and Opportunity
  Parry suggested that the “means, motive, op-
portunity” mantra of criminal attorneys is instructive 
in looking at alternative approaches to mitigating 
losses and protecting customers: 
•  Means. Using people’s identity characteristics (im-
personation).
•  Motive. Get money!
•  Opportunity. No foolproof method of tying “iden-
tity” to the real person. 
  “Motive” provides insight into opportunities 
for remedies, he posited. Thieves steal because they 
can and because there’s a gain to be had. Making it 
more difficult to steal money—even if thieves get 
in the door or gain access to data—reduces risk and 
protects customers. Also, when banks close one door, 
criminals seek to enter through another by changing 
their product/channel target, method, location, or 
targeted financial institution. Therefore, he argued, 
focusing risk management techniques, such as aberrant 
behavior monitoring, at the customer level rather than 
the product or channel level offers many advantages.
  According to Parry, in the absence of a more 
robust infrastructure to control identity, the objective 
must be to stop money from leaving the bank. “The 
mouse click does not mean that the money is out of 
the bank,” he stated. The money usually moves only Risky Business    29  www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
after the transaction has been loaded in a batch file 
for subsequent processing, much as it has for over 0 
years. Parry believes that this provides an opportunity 
for monitoring behavior at the customer level to po-
tentially stop fraud before a loss is realized.
  However, as more banks adopt more robust 
controls, banks with weaker controls will be at-
tacked—driven by the age-old doctrine of the path of 
least resistance. But what happens to smaller banks 
that can’t afford robust controls? “The industry can 
ill afford banks that may not have the expertise or re-
sources to manage risk adequately declaring that the 
sky is falling,” he stated. Phishing, he noted, is a good 
example. It’s an important risk, but it’s only social engi-
neering with a neat delivery channel. And it’s only one 
of the many risks we’re contending with at any given 
time. Many banks address phishing with a combination 
of controls: a robust process for responding to fraud or 
attempted fraud, internal transaction controls, collabo-
ration with one another and with law enforcement, 
and customer awareness training, thus ensuring that 
the impact is modest. 
Monitoring Aberrant Transactions  
  Financial institutions want robust, long-term 
remedies to identity, enrollment, and authentication 
challenges, Parry contended, but they must recognize 
that all solutions are fallible and have limited effective-
ness over time. The behavior models currently in use, 
primarily to stop credit card fraud, offer many “back-
stop opportunities while some promising emerging ven-
dor solutions mature. Let’s quit straightening the deck 
chairs on the Titanic and look out for the iceberg,” he 
concluded.
Conclusion 
  The conference’s timely discussion of electron-
ic payment risk in the 2st century especially benefited 
from the wide-ranging experiences and perspectives of 
the participants—panelists, moderators, and attendees. 
  Two key points were evident throughout the 
day-and-a-half of discourse:  
  The industry is engaged in managing electronic 
payments risk. Stakeholders in electronic payments are 
keenly aware of the risks associated with electronic pay-
ments and have taken significant actions to mitigate 
these risks, including working with third parties, such as 
merchants and processors, to reinforce security require-
ments and best practices at every level of exposure.  
  The industry has taken a proactive approach 
to electronic payments risk, recognizing that:  
  
-  The system is no more secure than its weakest link. 
-  Effective risk management is a cornerstone to 
maintaining trust in the payments system.    
  
  Many at the conference argued that the indus-
try must also discard its traditional “silo” approach to 
payments risk in favor of a more holistic management 
process. Holistic management includes addressing risk 
both on an enterprise level and across business rela-
tionships. Although some organizations have taken 
initial steps toward holistic risk management of elec-
tronic payments, most believe that the transition is in a 
nascent state.
  More must be done. At the same time many 
participants emphasized the dynamic nature of security 
management. Managing electronic payments risk is a 
job without an end because it continually evolves. Just 
as faster, cheaper, more powerful technology supports 
the ability of the financial services industry to expand 
products and electronify processes, it also provides 
fraudsters with more potent tools to attack systems. All 
fraud-fighting solutions must be regarded as temporary.  
  Participants generally argued that authentica-
tion processes must become more robust. They de-
bated—but did not resolve—the issue of whether more 
robust infrastructure involves modifying existing mag-
netic stripe and PIN-based technologies or a significant 
re-engineering of the infrastructure to support other 
technologies, such as smart cards.  
  A further challenge cited by a number of par-
ticipants is the increasing globalization of payment 
fraud. Because electronic payments are borderless, 
traditional protections provided by government are less 
meaningful. A significant amount of fraud in the U.S. 
electronic payments system originates from outside the 
country. Attention is needed to eliminate safe havens 
for electronic fraudsters anywhere in the world. This 
need is particularly compelling in light of the potential 
for electronic payment fraud, including money laun-
dering, to contribute to drug trafficking and interna-
tional terrorism.    
  Electronic payments have proven their value 
to all payment stakeholders, including the financial 
services industry, businesses, government, and consum-
ers. In reality, 2st century commerce could not survive 0    Risky Business www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc
without the highly efficient electronified systems that 
have evolved during the last decades. As many people 
at the conference emphasized, consumers have con-
fidence in electronic payments and have embraced 
the convenience and flexibility afforded by the many 
innovations. As such, it is incumbent on all industry 
participants to recognize the risks of losing consumer 
confidence if we fail to better manage the security risks 
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The Payment Cards Center was established to serve as a source of knowledge and expertise on this important segment 
of the financial system, which includes credit cards, debit cards, smart cards, stored-value cards, and similar payment 
vehicles.  Consumers’ and businesses’ evolving use of various types of payment cards to effect transactions in the economy 
has potential implications for the structure of the financial system, for the way that monetary policy affects the economy, 
and for the efficiency of the payments system.